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The Purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization's proposals for a National Missile Defense (NMD). This thesis compares
the costs of missile systems that will provide a NMD, such as Patriot Advanced
Capability - 3 (PAC-3), Navy Area (SM-2 Block rVA), Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater-Wide (SM-3), and the Ground-Based Interceptor
(GBI). The data gathered for this thesis included unclassified performance data and the
gross cost data relevant to the above systems. Interviews were conducted with personnel
that are expert in US Navy SPY radar and Aegis combat systems, and have knowledge of
SM-2 Block IVA and SM-3 missile systems.
This thesis concludes that there is redundancy in the development paths to
creating a single, centrally located Ground-Based Interceptor and radar (GBI/GBR) site.
By eliminating or amending the 1972 ABM Treaty to allow a multi-site NMD, a Coastal
NMD could be constructed in the near future, using technology that is available today and
missiles that will be placed on ships starting in 2002. As development of SM-3 and
THAAD missile technology continues, these systems could be used to implement a multi-
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In 1991 Sadam Hussein launched an Iraqi Scud missile at a pier in the Northern
Persian Gulf where US Navy Cargo Ships were offloading equipment and supplies in
support of the Operation Desert Shield military build-up. The equipment on that pier was
worth billions of dollars. US Navy Aegis/SPY Radar equipped Ticonderoga Class
Cruisers were patrolling nearby to protect the pier and the personnel unloading
equipment, supplies, and cargo. The Cruisers detected the ascent of an Iraqi Scud missile
shortly after it was launched from Iraq [Ref. 14].
They tracked the Scud through its ascent as it closed the distance to the pier. Even
though the Cruisers had the ability to detect and track the missile they had no weapon to
intercept it. Luckily, the scud widely missed the pier, impacting in an unpopulated area
[Ref. 14]. If the Iraqi Scud had struck its intended target, many lives would have been
lost, billions of dollars of equipment would have been destroyed, the Gulf War campaign
against Sadam Hussein would have been delayed months, if not years. Sadam 's forces
would have had more time to entrench themselves in Kuwait and the opportunity to
continue their invasion into the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. At the very least, there would
have been many more American and allied casualties. At the worst, the outcome of
Desert Storm could have been very different.
On 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-1, multi-stage ballistic
missile, which flew directly over Japan and continued for two-thirds of the distance to
Hawaii [Ref. 8]. Japanese Navy Congo Class Destroyers with exported American SPY-1
Radars detected the missiles shortly after launch, tracked them as they ascended and flew
over Japan, continued to track them as they descended, and were even able to detect
where they splashed into the Pacific [Ref. 14].
The North Korean Taepo Dong-1 test confirms the validity of the 1998 Rumsfeld
Commission Report, which stated that the U.S. might be within five years of being
threatened by ballistic missiles. For years, North Korea has been known as a major
exporter of missile technology. A North Korean representative made no attempt to hide
this, telling Capitol Hill staffers that the motivation for their sales is to obtain precious
hard currency for the famine-ridden nation. One of North Korea's major customers, Iran,
reportedly had technicians observing the missile test. It is speculated that Iran's next
missile, the Shahab-4, will come on line in the near future with help from North Korea,
China, and Russia [Ref. 23].
The missile test put North Korea in company with India, as one of few developing
nations to master multiple stage ICBM rockets. Pakistan and Iraq are not far behind.
That brings North Korea closer to building an intercontinental missile, with a range above
3,400 miles. The Taepo Dong-2 is estimated to have range of nearly 4,000 miles. The
1998 Rumsfeld Report also said that North Korea was "working hard on the Taepo Dong-
2" and that a lightweight version could reach most areas of the US [Ref. 8].
In 1999, the SM-2 Block IV Standard Missile is capable of achieving very high
altitude. The SPY-1 Radar and Aegis fire control system are capable of tracking and
engaging missiles at very high altitudes. The SM-2 Block IV missile has already been
developed, acquired, and produced. The Aegis system is installed on all Cruisers and
most Destroyers in the US Navy. Did the design specifications of Aegis and SM-2 Block
IV require these systems to have the capability to perform Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (TBMD)? How much testing and evaluation has been done in this area to
investigate the effectiveness of TBMD by Aegis ships carrying SM-2 Block IV missiles?
If these ships are effective TBMD platforms, then what is required to modify these ships
to perform National Missile Defense (NMD)?
B. AREA OF RESEARCH
This study investigates the background and foundation for the need for a National
Missile Defense. There is current debate in Congress concerning what new technology
should be developed and produced to achieve NMD. This thesis examines what our
capabilities are today in achieving TBMD and NMD and, if current capabilities are
sufficient, what is the most effective way to utilize in-place technology to achieve NMD.
This thesis compares and contrasts the various proposals made by the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO).
The thesis research consisted of an evaluation of the most likely threat in NMD; our
current capability to meet that threat; comparison of cost of acquisition of new
technology to achieve NMD versus the cost of modification and/or integration of current
technology to achieve NMD; and conclusions on the most cost effective way to achieve
NMD.
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY
If this thesis shows that the US Navy is currently capable of performing NMD,
then a great deal of acquisition costs can be avoided by not developing new systems to
perform NMD. This will save Congress and the taxpayers money. It will also make the
US Navy the primary service for NMD and likely secure further funding for current
programs such as DD-21, Smartship, Aegis, SM-2 Block X, etc.
If redundancies are found in program proposals and RDT&E, this thesis will
recommend changes to eliminate redundancies for cost avoidance. If there are areas
where a Department of Defense joint solution would be more efficient, this thesis will
make a recommendation for action or change.
This thesis attempts to point out where development is being done in an area or
technology that has already been developed. By eliminating redundancy with pre-
existing military or civilian technology, great cost avoidance can be achieved.
This study examines the Navy's current capabilities to perform NMD and
explains what further development is necessary to improve it. It describes the most
efficient way to achieve NMD.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary:
• Is the SM-2/Aegis combination a low-cost way the achieve effective NMD?
Secondary:
• What is the potential threat to the US that must be countered to accomplish the
mission of NMD?
• Is the SM-2 Block IV missile controlled by the Aegis fire control system able
to meet that threat?
• Are multiple Aegis ship platforms able to defeat multiple threats?
• What composition and position of ships is required for effective NMD?
• Is the DD-21 in its current configuration an effective platform for NMD?
• How effective are forward-deployed ships in the Persian Gulf in achieving
TBMD at point of launch?
How much will the acquisition of NMD technology cost?
E. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis investigated the following:
Aegis / SPY-1 Radar capabilities
Area and Theater BMD missile capabilities.
The programs of the BMDO.
Estimated requirements for cost effective NMD
Estimated cost of acquiring new technology to perform NMD.
NMD missile capabilities.
Threat missile capabilities.
Redeployment of current assets versus acquisition of new technology.
Efficient use (placement/configuration) of current assets in performing effective
NMD.
Conclude the most efficient way to achieve effective NMD.
F. METHODOLOGY
This is a comparative thesis. The methodology required for this thesis research can be
divided into the following steps:
• Review pertinent literature, including books, technical manuals, National Military
Strategy Doctrine, Acquisition estimates, and other NMD information resources.
• Determine the most likely threat to NMD.
• Contrast threat missile capability with US defensive systems capability.
• Determine the integration capabilities of Aegis ships in a multiple threat scenario.
• Determine the most cost-effective way to deploy US Navy cruisers and destroyers
to perform TBMD and NMD.
• Contrast current estimates of the cost of acquiring new technology to perform
NMD.
• Conclude with analysis to determine the most efficient way to achieve effective
NMD.
II. BACKGROUND
"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles that
deliver them pose a major threat and must remain a major focus of US defense policy and
budget allocations. The National Missile Defense program positions the United States to
deploy the most effective possible system to defend US territory when the threat warrants
such a deployment."
—William S. Cohen, SecDef, February 12, 1997
"The proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles in the world today poses a
direct, immediate threat to many of our allies and to some US forces deployed abroad in
defense of our national interests. Over time, the proliferation of longer-range missiles
could pose a greater threat to the US itself."
—Paul G. Kaminski, USD for A&T, March 6, 1997
A. HISTORY OF NMD
In September 1967, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced
President Lyndon Johnson's decision to deploy a limited anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
system that would be capable of protecting virtually the entire US population against
small-scale ballistic missile strikes. Five years later, the United States reversed course
and signed the ABM Treaty, which placed severe restrictions on superpower anti-missile
deployments [Ref. 1].
For nearly twenty years, the ABM Treaty and its underlying rationale enjoyed
widespread support among both US policymakers and members of the defense
establishment. In November 1991 the consensus supporting America's "no defense"
force posture had been severely shaken by world events that led Congress to demand the
deployment of a limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) system [Ref. 21].
The Iraqi ballistic missiles strikes of the Gulf War demonstrated that deterrence
cannot be relied upon to protect US forces or the US homeland from future missile
attacks, or from attacks with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC). The Gulf
War showed further that other means of protection - the global non-proliferation regime,
diplomacy, intelligence-gathering, and counterforce operations - are inadequate and must
be reinforced with an active defense capability such as NMD.
The need for BMD takes into consideration the post-Desert Storm consensus that
a threat to the US homeland is gradually emerging. It further considers the deployment
guidelines established by the 1991 Missile Defense Act, which were reaffirmed by the
1996 Ballistic Missile Defense Act. These considerations point to a phased BMD
production that begins with an NMD site at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Such a site
could be comprised of one hundred ground-based interceptors (GBIs) supported by
sensors capable of providing over-the-horizon track data on inbound missiles. The
benefit of this plan is that it will provide an effective NMD and also be compliant with
the ABM treaty because the Grand Forks deployment would be in protection of an ICBM
silo launcher fields [Ref. 12].
The Defense Department asserts to Congress that a Grand Forks deployment
could defend the entire Continental US (CONUS) against twenty to thirty reentry
vehicles coming from a generally northerly direction. Outside analysts concur with the
Pentagon's assessment. To protect the entire country against a wider range of threats,
America's phased BMD deployment could be completed with six additional GBI sites:
three more in CONUS, two in Alaska, and one in Hawaii. The BMD system would be
supported by space-based missile tracking sensors and be capable of shooting down about
two hundred NBC warheads [Ref. 40]. With space sensor support and a total of four
hundred GBIs deployed in CONUS, non-government studies indicate that in a two-
hundred-warhead attack, more than 95 percent of the inbound reentry vehicles could be
successfully engaged, thus saving millions of American lives [Ref. 17].
The ability to defend against two hundred warheads is proposed because this is
the largest number controlled by a single person— the commander of a Russian Typhoon
class submarine, which carries twenty strategic missiles, each armed with ten nuclear
warheads. The Central Intelligence Agency has determined that submarine and other
commanders of Russia's strategic forces could possibly defeat safety devices and launch
their weapons without civilian authorization [Ref. 25]. Moreover, some regional nuclear
powers, such as China and Russia, have already deployed nuclear arsenals comprising
between seventy and two hundred warheads [Ref. 5].
1. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
President Ronald Reagan first proposed SDI in March 1983 as a military research
program for developing an anti-BMD system. The Reagan administration thereafter
vigorously sought acceptance of SDI by the US and our NATO allies. As initially
described, the system would have provided total US protection against nuclear attack.
Reagan said it would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The conception
of SDI marked a break from the nuclear strategy that had been followed since the
inception of the arms race. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the signing of the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II), and the election in 1992 of Bill
Clinton, the SDI, like many other weapons programs, was given a lower budgetary
priority. In 1993, SecDef Les Aspin announced the abandonment of SDI and the
establishment of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, a less costly program that
would create a ground-based antimissile system [Ref. 34].
The SDI system was originally planned to provide a layered defense by means of
futuristic weapons technologies, several of which were only in a preliminary research
stage. The goal was to be able to intercept incoming missiles in midcourse, high above
the earth. Among the weapons required for the program were space and ground-based
nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle beams, and computer-guided projectiles fired by
electromagnetic rail guns - all under the central control of a supercomputer system. (The
space-based weapons and laser aspects of the system gained it the media name "Star
Wars," after the popular 1977 science-fiction film.)
SDI was originally projected to cost anywhere from $100 billion to $1 trillion.
Actual expenditures amounted to about $30 billion. The initial annual budget for BMDO
was $3.8 billion. To date over $49 billion has been spent on NMD (Table 1).
Table 1 - NMD Historical Funding


















2. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
At present, only a few countries, including Russia and China, possess missiles
that can strike the US, but the potential for this number to increase cannot be ignored.
Technology is spreading around the world at an astonishing rate, including technology
dealing with ballistic missile development and weapons of mass destruction.
Accelerating this growing technological trend is the continuing intent among some
regimes whose objective is to harm the international system, especially the US and our
allies. It is impossible to predict whether traditional methods of deterrence will operate
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under future conditions. Estimates are that a hostile regime could develop a long-range
ballistic missile within fifteen years or less, or buy or receive one even sooner [Ref. 55].
These trends establish an uncertain but very significant threat to national security.
As a result, the BMDO was formed to attempt to integrate technological development,
affordability, a counter to the potential threat, international treaty considerations, and
competing national defense priorities in order to establish the National Missile Defense
program. The NMD Joint Program Office was established to manage the multiple-
service components of a NMD system and oversee their integration into an effective
architecture.
The NMD program is a Deployment Readiness Program and a Major Defense
Acquisition Program intended to develop and maintain the capability to deploy an NMD
system. The goal of the BMDO is to reduce the lead-time required to deploy an NMD
system as a hedge against an uncertain threat. This will enable the United States to
respond quickly to an identified threat, with a defense system designed to counter that
specific threat. If deployment is required, the currently proposed NMD system could
protect the US against limited attack by long range missiles. However, it would not be
capable of repelling large massed attacks or attacks by short-range missiles from near US
shores. Development of an NMD system also may reduce the strategic value of long-
range ballistic missiles before they become commonly viewed as an essential component
of international power and prestige, and thereby present a strong incentive against
acquiring these missiles.
B. CURRENT NMD PROPOSAL OVERVIEW
From now until the year 2000, flight tests will continue at the national test range
in the Pacific [Ref. 31]. If eventually successful, these tests will indicate that an effective
and affordable NMD system can be built. The NMD program schedule is intended to
allow flexibility according to the global threat, offering several increasingly capable
deployment options as the Baseline NMD Program progresses.
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The initial '3+3 option' is intended to enable the US to develop, within three
years, the ability to deploy elements of a NMD system within another three years.
Increasingly-capable deployment options after the initial option will add further
capability with additional elements of the NMD system. [Ref. 32]
Although no deployment has yet been authorized, the NMD Deployment
Readiness Program is continuing technology development and initial system integration
with the goal of maturing the key components enough to field as a system. The key
NMD components include a ground-based interceptor (GBI), a ground-based radar
(GBR), Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), Battle Management / Command,
Control, and Communications (BM/C3 ), and space sensor technology [Ref. 20].
The GBI program is developing the technology and components for a state-of-the-
art, cost-effective, lightweight, non-nuclear, hit-to-kill missile, to intercept and destroy
inter-continental ballistic missiles targeted against the United States. Developing the GBI
is the highest priority in the NMD program. This program consists of two efforts: the
Exo-Atmospheric (outside the atmosphere) Kill Vehicle (EKV) and its booster. The
EKV efforts are currently concentrating on the technical issues of the interceptor seeker.
The EKV design began intercept flight testing in FY98 [Ref. 20].
The NMD GBR is designed to provide target identification, tracking, and
discrimination. NMD program developers have constructed a test bed radar to resolve
several technical issues and to participate in system testing. Upgrades to America's Early
Warning Radar network will provide existing forward-based attack warning systems with
the capability to augment the operations of a NMD system. These radars can be modified
on a very short schedule, with a significantly lower cost than the alternative of building
new radars. The BM/C" project is focused on integrating the NMD interceptor and
sensor operations in support of informed decision-making. At present, the BM/C 3
element is primarily intended to help find the best NMD command and control structure.
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develop communications architecture for the entire NMD system, and facilitate NMD
program integration [Ref. 20].
Another system vital to NMD is the Space Based Infrared System (SBIR).
Although not funded by BMDO, this system may be critical to theater and national
missile defense by providing surveillance, warning, and tracking data to overall missile
defense operations.
The BMDO has designed its United States NMD as the "3+3" program [Ref. 27].
It is intended to be both evolutionary and flexible. RDT&E was originally scheduled to
be completed by FY2000, after which the US would be able to quickly produce and
deploy a NMD system in response to changing world situations. Alternately, if
production and deployment are not funded, the 3+3 program calls for continuing
development and improvement of the system designs, while keeping it ready for
production and deployment on relatively short notice. Because of delays and shortfalls in
funding, this is what we are seeing today. This degree of program flexibility is essential
in the present world situation [Ref. 32].
The need for this kind of defense program flexibility is not new. Since the 1970s,
changes in defense missions and in the systems designed to implement them have
occurred every few years. NMD/TBMD missions have evolved from a deterrence-
enhancing role against a massive threat, requiring large numbers of defense interceptors,
to a protection role against regional or littoral aggression.
C. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION
As Desert Storm subsided, a storm of a different type erupted on Capitol Hill.
The war's lessons forced members of Congress to question our national defense security
framework. The resulting debate broke years of deadlock over strategic defense policies
and programs. Congressional passage of the 1991 Missile Defense Act demonstrated a
bipartisan consensus desiring strategic BMD [Ref. 9].
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Ballistic missile strikes might be carried out if another strategic power loses
control of the forces on its soil. This contingency was considered a real possibility during
the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis in China and during 1991 and 1993 political upheavals
in Russia [Ref. 34]. Purposeful attacks on the US are conceivable. A rogue nation or
regime might be highly motivated to attack US interests or forward-deployed forces in
order to disrupt a pending or on-going military campaign such as the NATO campaign
against Kosovo, to claim revenge for a US attack, or for other reasons. Long-range
ballistic missiles could be an attacker's delivery system of choice. America's current
vulnerability to ballistic missile attacks could invite such scenarios.
Political and social upheaval can strike strategic powers like China and the former
Soviet Union, thus threatening accidental or unauthorized missile launches. The global
non-proliferation regime may slow, but not stop, third world powers determined to
acquire NBC weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. New ballistic missile powers
could threaten the US in the next ten years or sooner. The United States must make NMD
force structure decisions on the basis of global strategic capabilities, not perceived
intentions, because today's friends could be tomorrow's enemies.
The United States cannot count on deterrence to protect our interests. Rational
and irrational enemies alike could threaten or carry out a missile strike on our forces. In
principle, the US can mount credible defenses at both the strategic and tactical levels
against terrorist NBC strikes such as suitcase bombs, as well as aircraft and cruise
missiles. Because the US has not committed to protecting its allies and military forces by
upgrading its defenses against theater ballistic missiles, the vulnerability of America
invites attack. Missile defense deployment timelines must be aggressive in their
anticipation of emerging threats. Deployments must be shortened to permit extensive
BMD training and exercises to ensure optimum performance of procured systems when
potential threats mature.
Given these assertions, congressional recommendations are [Ref. 9]:
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1.
BMD research and development and subsequent procurement programs to meet
current and potential ballistic missile threats.
2. ABM Treaty revisions that permit BMD R&D and procurement.
3. Cooperation with Russia and other countries to ensure that future BMD
development is compatible with strategic arms reduction efforts, world peace, and
stability.
We do not currently have the capability to destroy long-range ballistic missiles
launched against America. Officials and analysts have spent more than 30 years debating
whether and how the United States should defend itself against such threats. This debate
has been neither academic nor inexpensive. Since President Reagan's 1983 vision of a
global defense shield, Congress has appropriated almost $40 billion directly to the BMD
program in the hopes of fielding a system or systems capable of countering ballistic
missiles armed with mass destruction warheads. Many more billions of defense dollars
have contributed indirectly to the BMD effort; Congress does not see an end to such
spending. [Ref. 32]
In March 1996, the House and Senate Republican leadership introduced the
Defend America Act of 1996 [Ref. 29]. The outcome of this legislation set the course for
BMD into the next century. A change in the White House in November of 2000 might
alter this calculus. The current NMD debate describes the two major competing visions
of how NMD should be pursued and explores the key substantive differences between
those visions.
The vote over NMD hinges on ideological and partisan grounds. Conservatives
and some moderates view the deployment of ballistic missile defenses to defend the US
as a significant difference between Democrats and Republicans. Such a difference
demonstrates the degree to which the parties will commit scarce budget resources to a
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key national security concern. Many conservatives' point out that most Americans
believe they are defended against ballistic missile attack. When told otherwise, the
public expresses support for NMD because rogue states may be able to attack the nation
with ballistic missiles. In contrast, liberals and other moderates note that NMD is not
needed now because the United States faces no current long-range ballistic missile threats
[Ref. 56]. Because NMD demonstrates a key difference between the parties, many
conservatives believe the outcome of the current debate will play an important role in the
year 2000 presidential and congressional races.
Another aspect of this ideological debate is the degree to which decision-makers
and analysts stress NMD in an overall national strategy to counter the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This overall strategy includes a broad
range of arms control agreements and negotiations, export control laws, and military
deterrence. The strongest NMD advocates place less credibility on these other
"counterproliferation" tools. Others, including the Clinton Administration, seek a
compromise, including an ABM Treaty-compliant BMD development program, coupled
with strong advocacy of each of these tools.
1. Defend America Act of 1996
The stated purpose of the Defend America Act of 1996 [Ref. 29] is to seek to
establish a US policy for the deployment of an NMD system. The act asserts that the
ballistic missile proliferation threat to the US is significant and growing. It asserts that
the deployment of an effective NMD system will reduce the incentives for countries to
develop or otherwise acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus serving to inhibit and
counter the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It also finds that it
is in the interest of all nations to pursue a form of strategic deterrence based on defensive
capabilities and strategies, rather than deterrence based on offensive means.
The Defend America Act establishes, as US policy, the deployment of an NMD
system with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by the end of 2003 as a transition
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step away from an offense-only form of deterrence. The Act requires that this NMD
system be capable of providing a highly-effective defense of the US against limited,
unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks. The NMD system would also have
to be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more
sophisticated threats as they emerge. The Act requires that the NMD interceptor system
provide defensive coverage of the entire US and include one or more of the following
programs: ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, space-based kinetic energy
interceptors, and space-based directed energy weapons [Ref. 29]. The overall system
would include fixed ground-based radars, space-based sensors (including the Space and
Missile Tracking System), and battle management, command, control, and
communications elements.
The Act would urge the President to reach an agreement with Russia to amend the
ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of the NMD system envisioned in the Act. If
agreement is reached, the Act requires the President to submit the agreement to the
Senate for its advice and consent. Absent such agreement within one year after
enactment of the Act, the Act calls for the President and Congress to consider exercising
the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of that treaty [Ref. 29].
2. Clinton Administration's NMD Program
The Clinton Administration will make its final decision whether to budget
procurement funds in 2001 for the proposed National Missile Defense. The program's
stated mission requirement is the defense of all 50 states against a limited missile attack
by a rogue nation; it would also provide some capability to defend the United States
against a small accidental or unauthorized missile attack from more nuclear-capable
states. Although the Administration has stated it plans to decide in June 2000 whether to
deploy a NMD, its budgetary proposals include about $4 billion for that purpose over the
2001-2005 period. Combined funding for RDT&E and procurement of all theater and
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national missile defense programs would average about $4.4 billion annually over the
2000-2005 period compared with $4.0 billion appropriated for 1999 [Ref. 30].
The Clinton Administration proposes to hold the funding level for all DoD
RDT&E to about $34 billion a year with little year-to-year variation over the 2000-2005
period. The current request is not much different from that of June 1998. But in 1999,
appropriations for RDT&E totaled about $36.6 billion [Ref. 30]; thus, the current request
produces a real reduction in funding for that category that would total about 17 percent in
2005. Activities in the Army and Navy would fall by about 20 percent and 17 percent,
respectively, in real terms. Air Force funding would fall below the CBO baseline by
about 13 percent in 2005, and RDT&E in defense-wide activities would be about 22
percent lower in that year.
DoD has long stressed the importance of a qualitative "edge" over potential
adversaries, and funding for RDT&E has been a key part of maintaining that superiority.
As in weapons procurement, a steady-state approach to RDT&E funding might appear to
be useful. However, the aging of weapons would have less effect on the edge that US
forces now enjoy than would innovations developed by enemy forces. In 1990, budget
authority for RDT&E totaled about $40 billion in 2000 dollars [Ref. 38]. By 2005, the
Administration's plan would take the category's budget authority to about 70 percent of
that level, suggesting an order of magnitude for the increases that might be needed in the
future.
A key element in the Administration's plan is to finalize outstanding ABM Treaty
understandings, such as formalizing the political commitment the United States and the
Commonwealth of Independent States have made to the ABM Treaty. In October 1992,
the Commonwealth states signed an agreement at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, wherein the
parties agreed as a collective body to assume all the rights and obligations of the ABM
Treaty [Ref. 34]. Although the United States and the key Commonwealth states agree on
the formal need to expand the membership of the ABM Treaty, a final and detailed
agreement has not been agreed upon. When signed, the rights and obligations of the
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Treaty will be assumed by all that signed. Those who do not sign will not be bound by
the agreement. The President's position, therefore, is to ensure as extensive participation
in the Treaty as possible.
3. Deterrence and the ABM Treaty
The issue of offensive nuclear deterrence remains central to the debate over
BMD. To some of the supporters of the Defend America Act of 1996, the 1972 ABM
Treaty embodies much of the immorality of guaranteeing the vulnerability of the US
population in the strategic relationship (Mutual Assured Destruction) that existed
between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Many
supporters believe that the ABM Treaty is a relic that not only stands in the way of
deploying effective BMD, but stands in the way of moving toward strategic stability
based on defensive deterrence. The Defend America Act and its supporters assert that
effective BMD systems would serve to deter others from acquiring ballistic missiles
armed with mass destruction warheads [Ref. 26]. These arguments, which began in
earnest with the advent of Reagan's "Star Wars" vision, have aroused but not persuaded
Capitol Hill.
Others, however, believe that offensive deterrence remains valid and critical to
the strategic relationship between the United States and former Soviet Union. It is
because the Defend America Act threatens this relationship, that the White House
continues to defer funding of a NMD. For example, the Act requires an initial NMD
deployment to be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and
more sophisticated threats. Second, the Act makes it US policy to seek a cooperative
transition away from an offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic
stability. Third, the Act directs the Secretary of Defense to deploy an NMD that includes
one or more of four ABM interceptor options, three of which would violate the ABM
Treaty. The one treaty-compliant option is basically the Clinton Administration plan.
Administration officials point out that supporters of the Act generally believe that a
ground-based only system is a mistake and that they have argued for years the need to
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place weapons and interceptors in space. Finally, the Act requires amendment of the
ABM Treaty within one year or formal withdrawal should be considered. Administration
officials have said Russia would see this as tantamount to an "anticipatory breach" of the
Treaty and that it would put the strategic nuclear arms reduction treaties (START-I and
START-II) at risk. To the Administration, these elements of the Act are viewed
negatively as Reagan Star Wars ideology that reflects disdain for the ABM Treaty and the
strategic stability between the United States and Russia.
Major disagreements over NMD also include three related cost issues. The first
concerns aggregate NMD system costs. They are noted here because key players in the
current debate are using them. Some key committee staff supporters believe that it
would cost about $3 to $7 billion (depending on which of the four interceptor options
were pursued) to field an NMD system that meets the immediate requirements of the Act
[Ref. 10]. They also point out that this money is part of the Republican balanced budget,
and is not new money. The Missile Defense Study Team at the Heritage Foundation
maintains that a sea-based ABM system could be achieved by employing AEGIS cruisers
and their infrastructure. This system would cost about $6 billion and could be deployed
by 2002 [Ref. 17].
There is wide disagreement as to how much it will cost to develop and produce a
Ground Based Interceptor Missile and deploy 100 of those missiles to North Dakota.
General Malcolm ONeill, former Director of the BMDO, stated that a single ground-
based treaty-compliant system might cost about $5 billion; more recently, he estimated
the cost at $7 to $8 billion [Ref. 10]. Earlier this year Representative Livingston,
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, quoted $13 to $16 billion for a NMD
deployment. Robert Bell, Senior Director, National Security Council, cites a figure of
$20 billion for a two-site, land-based ABM system - money that he says is not in the
Future Year Defense Budget or the DoD outyear budgets. The CBO estimates the cost to
develop and deploy a layered NMD system at $31 to $60 billion [Ref. 30]. It would
include both ground and space based weapons. Finally, the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments argues that, while limited NMD deployments are likely to cost as
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little as $5 billion, effective, layered NMD deployments envisioned in the Act could cost
more than $50 billion, and those costs could be underestimated by 20 to 40 percent [Ref.
21].
The Clinton Administration maintains that its NMD plan will produce cost
savings if the ballistic missile threat does not appear sooner than expected (i.e., in less
than 10 years). The NMD program, therefore, could advance indefinitely at relatively
low funding levels until it was necessary to deploy a system, thus saving large sums of
money that would be used to build and deploy a near-term NMD required under the
Defend America Act. Supporters of the Act admit that less money might be spent over
the near term, but raise the question of how much risk we should assume [Ref. 53]. This
leads to the third issue. A significant difference exists between NMD supporters who
want to deploy an NMD system as soon as possible and others who believe that NMD
can wait. The former believes that the risk simply is too great. Cost considerations
should not be the determining factor; they are therefore willing to pay a higher insurance
premium to insure against the risk of a ballistic missile attack on the United States. In
contrast, opponents of this crash NMD deployment effort are satisfied with paying a
lower insurance premium and believing that there will be sufficient time to deploy a
system when required, thus saving money and allowing NMD technology to continue
development.
The 1972 ABM Treaty limits the development, testing, and deployment of
defensive systems capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles. The Treaty and its
1974 Protocol limit the participants to a system of no more than 100 ground-based
interceptors deployed at a single site [Ref. 1]. Many consider this to be the "foundation
of strategic stability" between the United States and the former Soviet Union because it
ensures retaliatory capability without an offensive nuclear arms race.
As of March 1999, the Senate has voted to continue funding to develop a National
Missile Defense. The next chapter will examine the current proposals that will be funded
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in the year 2000 defense budget, how much each will cost, and specific capabilities and
details of each proposal.
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HI. CURRENT NMD MISSILE AND RADAR PROGRAMS
NMD is the term that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has given to the
defense of America from ballistic missile attack. BMDO programs are divided into three
separate and logically complementary groups. The groups are lower-tier area ballistic
missile defense, upper tier theater ballistic missile defense, and Battle Management
Command and Control Systems with Space-Based Infrared (SBIR) weapons and sensors.
The lower-tier, area BMD is the simplest and most developed of these
technologies. Lower-tier missiles are endo-atmospheric missiles. They remain in the
earth's atmosphere and intercept missiles at or below 33 km / 20.5 miles. Lower-tier
BMD programs use existing radar technology and conventional missile designs, such as
air fins, infrared seeker heads, and boosted, single-stage rocket motors [Ref. 19].
Upper-tier, theater-wide BMD is much more complex. This missile technology is
exo-atmospheric. These intercept missiles must leave the earth's atmosphere and must
guide themselves in space by using thruster technology found on satellites and spacecraft
in order to hit their targets. Upper-tier missiles are designed to engage targets at altitudes
up to 150 km / 93.2 miles. Both upper and lower tier BMD missiles use hit-to-kill (HTK)
warheads. HTK warheads have much more energy than conventional fragmentation
warheads. This additional energy is needed to destroy and incinerate very large ballistic
missiles that may carry nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads. For example, an older
Patriot-2 missile with a fragmentation warhead will hit a missile with 0.3 megajoules of
energy because only a small percentage of the fragments hit their target. A lower-tier
area BMD missile, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC-3), with a hit-to-
kill warhead will impact its target with 310 megajoules of energy because all the energy
of the PAC-3 missile, including the warhead guidance system and missile body, are
impacting on the target [Ref. 4]. The difference between a fragmentation warhead and a
hit-to-kill warhead is a 1000% increase in energy. The trade-off is that a much better
guidance system is required to intercept the target with a HTK warhead because a miss
has no effect on the target.
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The Battle Management Command And Control Systems with Space-Based
Infrared weapons and sensors includes both ground and space based radars and optical
infrared sensors to detect and track ballistic missiles as they travel through the
atmosphere, into space, and back into the atmosphere to their target. SBIR satellites will
have the ability both to detect ballistic missiles and to engage them with a Space-Based
Laser (SBL) [Ref. 22].
A. PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY (PAC-3)
The first BMD program this thesis will examine is the Patriot Advanced
Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile. The PAC-3 is a lower-tier ballistic missile interceptor.
The PAC-3 is the maturest of the BMDO NMD proposals. It is currently in the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition process.
PAC-3 is being fielded in three phased configurations. The first two configurations
provided the Army with improved operational performance. The third configuration will
provide the final element in the form of the hit-to-kill interceptor missile, along with
additional communications, a single phased array radar, and ground support system
improvements (Figure 1). The first deliveries of the ground system hardware and
software have already begun, and development and operational testing will start this year.
All of these efforts support a First Unit Equipped (FUE) date of late FY 1999.
The PAC-3 design program began in 1983, but flight-testing was not funded until
1987, when the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin Vought Systems, was awarded a
contract worth $80 million. The program is intended to provide intercept capability
against both TBMs and air-breathing missiles. The PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill for its prime
kill mechanism with a secondary ring-type warhead of small pellets as a lethality
enhancement against air-breathing targets [Ref. 19].
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Figure 1 Ref. 44
To save cost, the PAC-3 is designed to utilize existing Patriot missile launcher
units with some modifications. The missile uses inertial guidance for fly-out to the
predicted intercept point. The weapons trajectory can be updated during flight using the
Patriot fire control radar system. In the last two seconds of flight, a nose-mounted pulse
Doppler radar seeker antenna is activated to terminally guide the missile to target. The
Doppler radar also provides proximity fusing to activate the secondary kill system pellets
[Ref. 46].
B. NAVY AREA BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
"In the business of theater missile defense, I really do believe that the Navy has a
tremendous contribution to make with an AEGIS force already well-invested in... I'm
excited about the potential of both lower-tier and upper-tier capabilities... I think it's
relevant and a very, very potent capability for our country..."
- Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations July, 1996
Ninety percent of the world population is within 200 miles of an ocean, sea, or
gulf. The joint effort between the Navy and the BMDO to develop the Navy Area BMD
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and Navy Theater-Wide BMD programs will expand the Navy's mission with a real
capability to defeat the growing ballistic missile threat. Capitalizing on rapid
advancements in missile guidance, propulsion, and seeker technology, the Navy is on the
verge of being able to protect U.S. and Allied forces ashore when threatened by ballistic
missile attacks [Ref. 42].
The mission of the Navy Area BMD system is to provide U.S. and Allied forces,
as well as areas of vital national interest, defense against theater ballistic missiles
(TBMs). AEGIS cruisers and destroyers, equipped with a modified AEGIS combat
system, will detect and track short to medium-range TBMs and engage them with the
Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IVA interceptor missile (Figure 2).
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The Navy has the flexibility to forward-deploy sea-based BMD forces to potential
crisis spots in regions where land-based forces can not deploy. Since these sea-based
forces will be deployed in international waters, no foreign governmental approval is
needed. Thus, an effective defense capability can be put in place to provide Navy Area
BMD before hostilities erupt or before land-based BMDs can be transported to the
theater. If air and ground forces have to fight their way into a theater of operation, Navy
ships can provide critical area defense coverage early in the conflict. Additionally, BMD
provided by ships at sea will greatly reduce demand on our airlift and sealift assets.
Desert Storm demonstrated the great time and resources required to move defense forces
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into a theater of operation with an active TBM threat. Deployed Naval forces with BMD
capabilities could enable a theater commander to concentrate available lift on anti-armor
systems, tanks, troops, ammunition, and other reinforcements needed to stop an enemy
advance.
The Navy has many years of experience with Battle Force air defense and has
developed the command and control systems necessary to conduct area defense from the
sea. The ability to integrate satellite communications, the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS), Tactical Related Applications/Tactical Receive Equipment
(TRAP/TRE), Naval Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A), and other vital
intelligence, sensor, and tactical information makes the Navy a logical choice to have a
role in BMD [Ref. 14].
The Navy successfully demonstrated BMD capability recently when a ballistic
missile target was shot out of the sky for the first time using a Block IVA version of the
proven SM-2 missile. With this intercept, the Navy moved into a new era where it will
play an increasingly vital role in the defense of forces ashore.
C. SPY-1 RADAR AND AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEM
The AN/SPY- 1 Radar is the electronically-scanned, fixed-array radar for the
Navy Aegis fleet air defense missile system. It operates in the E/F Band with an output
of several megawatts. The Raytheon transmitter serves several parallel channels
simultaneously. The arrays are in four sections, each covering 90 degrees of azimuth.
Each array has 4100 discrete element nodes and measures 3.65m octagonal. The Spy
radar has no moving parts. The four radar elements are controlled by AN/UYK-7
computers to steer multiple radar beams for target search, detection, classification, and
tracking [Ref. 24]. The Linebacker upgrade is a software patch, which enables the
AN/UYK computers installed on all Aegis ships to compute the necessary intercept data
to guide an intercept missile to hit and destroy a fast moving ballistic missile. The SPY
Radar can track missiles at a distance of 300 km / 186 miles [Ref. 1 1].
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The SPY-1 Radar first went to sea in 1974 and has undergone continuous
improvement and upgrade over the last 25 years. The latest version is the SPY-1 B/D
used on the Arleigh Burke Destroyers and the latest Tichonderoga Cruisers. The Patriot
single-array radar and the THAAD ground-based radar are both based on the SPY-1
phased-array radar design [Ref. 19].
A major benefit of the SPY/Aegis combination is that, unlike a Patriot or THAAD
control truck, a Navy Cruiser/Destroyer Combat Information Center (CIC) has room for
more than a dozen operators, allowing multiple targets to be delegated to different
trackers, thereby reducing information overload on the decision-makers [Ref. 15]. A
Navy ship also has the ability to easily generate the very large amounts of power required
for the radar. An Aegis cruiser or destroyer can track and engage 100+ targets by itself,
and multiple Aegis ships can automatically coordinate with each other for cooperative
intercept scenarios [Ref. 16].
The Navy Area BMD program includes modifications to the Aegis Combat
System and SPY-1 Radar to enable detection, tracking, and engagement of TBMs using
SM-2 Block IVA missiles, and minor changes to existing command and control systems.
More than 50 Aegis cruisers and destroyers are at sea or under construction and the
support, training, and logistics infrastructure is already in place and operating [Ref. 24].
A User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) called "Linebacker" is at sea today to
provide feedback to the BMDO and to influence tactical design improvements [Ref. 14].
Linebacker could be quickly made available for contingency use by regional military
commands such as Commander-in-Chief Europe.
Two Aegis cruisers, Lake Erie, and Port Royal, were the first to receive
Linebacker upgrades in September 1998. Successful sea trials were completed in
October 1998. The Linebacker ships have been conducting at-sea testing, developing
core doctrine and tactics, and serving as models for getting our BMD capability to sea.
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The Lake Erie and Port Royal are scheduled to complete 15 BMD intercept tests in the
next 18 months [Ref. 14].
D. SM-2 BLOCK IVA STANDARD MISSILE
Development of the SM-2 missile for cruiser and destroyer use began in 1969
with a view to use the SM-2 with the Aegis /Spy Radar system, incorporating mid-course
guidance correction. After extensive RDT&E, production of the SM-2 Block I began in
1977 and entered service in 1979. The Block II version upgrade integrated the New
Threat Upgrade (NTU) package for the baseline Ticonderoga (CG-47) Cruisers. The
Block MB missiles entered service in 1990, incorporating upgrades from the Missile
Homing Improvement Program [Ref. 11].
Development of the SM-2 Block IV missiles began in July 1987. These are
dedicated, vertically-launched, ER missiles for the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke class
ships. They entered service in 1994 and remain the Navy's primary surface-to-air missile
[Ref. 11].
SM2 Block IVA and the PAC-3 missiles are developmental counterparts and are
both being produced in Tucson, Arizona, by Raytheon [Ref. 14]. SM-2 Block IVA
missiles incorporate an Area BMD role by providing a lower-tier or endo-atmospheric
system in support of near-shore, littoral-warfare operations. SM-2 Block IVA missiles
conduct engagements against aircraft and anti-ship missiles in the same way as previous
SM-2 Block TV and earlier missiles. Against ballistic missiles, the SM-2 IVA receives
the usual mid-course guidance data, but in the terminal phase, as the missile approaches
the target, the IR seeker fairing is ejected and the missile rotates to bring the seeker to
bear. This puts the missile under internal IR guidance, and the image is resolved until the
target comes within view of the forward-looking proximity fuse. The missile then guides
itself to the intercept point where the warhead is detonated [Ref. 24].
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The Block IVA has added the ballistic missile interception capability in the endo-
atmospheric lower-tier to 33 km but is also able to intercept targets at sea level. This
makes the Block IVA a very useful multi-purpose intercept missile. It is capable of
destroying many types of conventional missiles, such as the Exocet sea skimming
missile, aircraft of almost all types that fly at Mach 2.5 or less (most aircraft in existence,
with exceptions like the US SR-71 and Russian MIG-29), and all lower tier ballistic
missiles such as the Iraqi Scud [Ref. 11].
Following successful lethality testing at White Sands, New Mexico, the Navy
Area BMD program was approved for entry into EMD on 22 February 1997 [Ref. 22].
The program commenced development flight testing in 1999, followed by an at-sea
demonstration of the Aegis Linebacker upgrade. To date, the SM-2 IVA has successfully
passed four seeker angle tests, six warhead sled tests, and eight TBM threat tests. On 24
January 97, SM2-IVA hit a Lance Missile simulated ballistic missile target. On 18-20
November 1999 at the Pacific Missile Test Range near Hawaii, the Lake Erie and Port
Royal successfully conducted an at-sea ballistic missile tracking exercise where the SPY
radar was able to detect the launch of a ballistic missile and track it throughout its flight
until it splashed into the Ocean [Ref. 14].
To equip 57 Aegis destroyers and 22 Aegis cruisers with Navy Area BMD
capability between fiscal year 1998 and 201 1, the Navy plans to buy 1,500 SM-2 Block
IVA missiles. The Navy also plans to field a prototype system, incorporating the
Linebacker upgrade, beginning in September 1999. This will provide an interim BMD
capability and allow fleet personnel to evaluate the system. The Navy plans to equip the
two Linebacker cruisers with a total of 35 SM-2 IVA missiles for testing and/or use in a
national emergency [Ref. 7].
E. NAVY THEATER-WIDE BMD (NTW)
For the Navy's Theater-Wide BMD, or upper-tier / exo-atmospheric defense, the
BMDO has proposed the development of a next generation Standard Missile (SM-3).
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The SM-3 will provide Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers with a
lightweight exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Kinetic Warhead (KW) to intercept
longer-range, higher-flying ballistic missile threats [Ref. 36].
Functional Technology Validation (FTV) tests call for the SM-3 missile to be
launched from modified Navy Vertical Launch System canisters in the same way as
current SM-2 missiles (Figure 3). After 111 seconds of fly-out, the nose cone covering
the KW is ejected and the third stage of the missile ignites. The KW is ejected 46
seconds later and within 20 seconds, intercepts the ballistic missile target at a range of
425 km / 260 miles and at an altitude of 122 km [Ref. 43].
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SM-3 Block I will be the Engineering Manufacturing Development missiles and
SM-3 Block II will be the initial operating capability missiles. Block I missile RDT&E is
scheduled to be completed by 2002 and, if production is funded, it is anticipated that 650
SM-3 Block II will be produced. The SM-3 can reach an altitude of 76 miles while at a
range of 260 miles [Ref. 30]. These are the unclassified capabilities of SM-3. Note that
this data is a combination point on an ellipse. Neither the altitude nor range is an
absolute maximum point.
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F. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
THAAD is a ground-based weapon system being developed by the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization and the Army to defeat theater ballistic missiles by
intercepting them in flight. The system supports the national objective of NMD and
TBMD.
The THAAD system is an easily-transportable battery of missiles capable of hit-
to-kill interception of incoming tactical theater ballistic missiles at heights up to 150
times greater than the patriot missile used in Desert Storm, and at ranges of up to 125
miles [Ref. 19]. The THAAD proposal is intended to allow existing air defense systems
to continue the role of anti-aircraft defense while THAAD performs TBMD and /or
NMD.
The THAAD system includes missile launchers, radar, and fire control
components integrated into truck beds or trailers that will fit into the cargo bay of C- 130
military cargo aircraft (Figure 4). THAAD can receive tracking and targeting data from
space-based sensor satellites such as Brilliant Eyes or its own Raytheon ground based
radar (GBR), which is a 9.2m2 array-sized 25,344 Hz I/J band radar which performs the
duties of surveillance, threat identification, and classification [Ref. 19]. The GBR is
essentially similar to one of the four phased-array radars from the Aegis Cruiser /
Destroyer SPY-ID radars.
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The THAAD program is currently in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
(PD&RR) phase of development and is the maturest of our upper-tier TAMD systems. In
1997, as a result of failure to achieve an intercept in flight tests and the need to reduce
technical and programmatic risk, the QDR endorsed a plan to restructure the program and
to achieve a FUE in 2007 [Ref. 33].
After flight test seven, BMDO and the Army commissioned an Independent
Review Team (IRT) to review the program's processes and the design of the THAAD
missile. The IRT has had a direct impact on the way the THAAD program is conducting
business [Ref. 48]. Ground-testing is where the most recent technical problems have been
detected, and, consequently, the rigorousness of the ground-testing program has been
increased [Ref. 4].
The 6.2m long, 900kg launch weight THAAD missile is a single-stage, solid-
fueled missile capable of both endo and exo-atmospheric intercepts [Ref. 19]. A target
object map and predicted intercept point is provided to the missile prior to launch; after
which the missile receives in-flight updates. Terminal homing is an infrared nose-
mounted unit with the seeker looking through an un-cooled side window with a shroud,
which will separate prior to terminal homing. THAAD must hit to kill.
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The extremely fast THAAD missiles are expected to engage targets out to 125(+)
miles and intercept inbound missiles as high as 93 miles in altitude. The THAAD is a
shoot-look-shoot missile, meaning that two THAAD missiles will be launched to engage
one inbound missile. Each THAAD missile has a kill probability (Pk) of 0.9 [Ref. 19].
THAAD missiles are continuing development at the White Sands Missile Test
Range and the Navy's Pacific Missile Test Range. On 10 June 1999, THAAD had its
first successful missile intercept after eight failures [Ref. 57]. THAAD is continuing
testing and development by the BMDO in conjunction with Lockheed Martin.
G. GROUND BASED INTERCEPTOR (GBI)
The GBI and its associated components provide the 'Sveapon" of the
NMD system. Its mission is to strike high-speed ballistic missile warheads in
the midcourse or exo-atmospheric phase of their trajectories and destroy
them by force ofimpact [Ref. 32]. The GBI consists of three components. The
first component is the missile payload called the kill vehicle. The kill vehicle
has its own sensors, propulsion, communications, guidance, and computing
functions which all work together to complete the intercept.
The second component is a booster that will propel the EKV toward an
approximate intercept location so that the EKV can perform terminal
maneuvers to impact the incoming warhead.
The third component is the ground command and launch equipment
that is needed to launch the interceptor. This consists of the hardware and
software for interface with the BM/C 3 system control consoles, and missile
silos required to accomplish daily maintenance and readiness functions and
to launch the interceptor upon command.
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NMD interceptor missile proposals will use existing off-the-shelf motors by
United Technologies and Alliant Tech Systems, with a generic exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle (EKV) cutaway at the top. No decision has been made to produce or deploy any
element of the NMD system, including interceptor missiles. They, along with associated
radars, command and control systems, and space and ground-based launch detection
systems could be deployed by 2005 if it is determined that there is an emerging threat to
the US of a limited ballistic missile attack [Ref. 30].
During flight, the GBI receives information from the NMD BM/C system to
update the location of the incoming ballistic missile, enabling the GBI on board sensor
system to identify and home-in on the target [Ref. 36]. The GBI will consist of a multi-
stage solid propellant booster and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. Each missile will
contain 27,766 pounds of solid propellant fuel. The exo-atmospheric kill vehicle will
contain approximately 30 pounds of liquid propellant [Ref. 39].
The deployed GBI will be a dormant missile that remains in its underground silo
until launch. A launch will occur only in defense of the US from a ballistic missile
attack. There will be no flight testing of the missiles at the NMD deployment site. The
technical status of each missile will be monitored and any required maintenance
conducted at a contractor's offsite production facility. Interceptors in storage at the GBI
site will be used to replace missiles requiring repair or selectively removed for reliability
testing [Ref. 39]. Developmental and operational testing of the GBI will be conducted at
designated US missile test ranges.
The initial GBI site deployment will be 20 interceptor missiles. The GBI site will
contain launch silos, missile receiving and processing buildings, missile storage facilities,
and additional support facilities. Approximately 600 acres will be required to support the
GBI missile field and associated technical facilities. When the GBI site and associated
technical facilities become fully operational, total site-related employment will be
approximately 150 to 200 personnel [Ref. 39].
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GBI Characteristics are all classified, but in accordance with the directed
requirements of the NMD proposal, the GBI missiles must be capable of defending all of
CONUS from one central site in North Dakota. In order to do this, the GBI missile will
need a range of greater than 1,000 miles / 1.600 km [Ref. 27]. In order to intercept an
inbound ICBM, the GBI will also be required to reach any altitude and travel at high
mach speed.
H. AIRBORNE LASER (ABL)
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that US military forces have limited capability
against theater ballistic missiles. US defensive capability is limited to weapons that
defend against missiles nearing the end of their flight, such as the Patriot. No capability
exists to destroy missiles in the boost phase shortly after launch. Consequently, DoD is
expending considerable resources to develop the ABL's capability to intercept missiles in
their boost phase. The ABL program involves placing various components, including a
powerful multi-megawatt laser, a beam control system, and related equipment, in a
Boeing 747-400 aircraft [Ref. 54], and ensuring that all the components work together to
detect and destroy enemy ballistic missiles in their boost phase.
The ABL program is DoD's first attempt to design, develop, and install a multi-
megawatt laser on an aircraft. The ABL is also expected to be DoD's first system to
intercept missiles during the boost phase. To successfully destroy a missile in its boost
phase, the ABL system would have to, within about 30 to 140 seconds, detect a missile
shortly after it has been launched several hundred kilometers away, track the rising
missile's path, and hold a concentrated laser beam on the missile until the beam's heat
causes the missile's pressurized casing to fracture and then explode [Ref. 54]. This
explosion would then cause a missile's warhead, along with any nuclear, chemical, or
biological agents it may contain, to fall short of the intended target and possibly back on
the aggressor's territory. The range of the ABL is specified to be 310 miles / 500 km
[Ref. 54]. The obvious limitation of the ABL is that it must be at the right place at the
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right time. Being able to intercept an ICBM in its boost phase means flying an ABL 747
in the vicinity of the threat either continuously or as the situation dictates.
The ABL will operate from a central base in the US and be available for deployment
worldwide. The program calls for a seven-aircraft fleet, with five aircraft to be available
for operational duty at any given time. The other two aircraft are to be undergoing
modifications or down for maintenance or repair. When the ABLs are deployed, two
aircraft will fly, in figure-eight patterns, above the clouds at 40,000 feet. Through in-
flight refueling, which is to occur between 25,000 and 35,000 feet, and rotation of
aircraft, two ABLs will always be on patrol, ensuring 24-hour coverage of potential
missile launch sites within the theater of operations. The ABLs are intended to operate
about 90 kilometers behind the front line of friendly troops but could move forward once
air superiority has been established in the theater of operations [Ref. 54]. When on patrol,
the ABLs are to be provided the same sort of fighter and/or surface-to-air missile
protection provided to other high-value air assets, such as the Airborne Warning and
Control System and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.
Unlike the PAC-3, SM-2 Block IVA, THAAD, and SM-3 missiles, the ABL is not
part of the incremental development of the GBI missile. The ABL is part of the
concurrent development of the space-based laser. The ABL is included here because it is
a part of the NMD proposal.
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IV. THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 95-19
A significant chasm exists in the NMD debate over estimates of the ballistic
missile threat to the United States. In general, this has focused on a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) 95-19, whose key findings were initially reported as free of contention.
The NIE testified that the US will not face a new long-range ballistic missile threat prior
to 2010 [Ref. 55]. The NIE further stated that the North Korean Taepo Dong II, which
might have the range to reach Hawaii or Alaska, would not be operational within the next
5 years. Some cite recent Chinese threats to launch missiles against Los Angeles if the
US interfered in any Chinese-Taiwan conflict as evidence that the US does face a current
threat. Administration officials dismiss such threats as rhetoric and note that conflict
with China is not new. The US has long included China in its nuclear deterrence
strategies [Ref. 25].
The NIE energized the BMD debate. To the Administration, the assessment
rendered its '3+3' NMD plan prudent. But critics pointed to serious flaws. The first is
that the NIE was simply wrong; rogue states have the means and the desire to develop
and field ballistic missiles that could threaten the US. The Intelligence Community (IC)
response is that such efforts among rogue states are too technologically-challenging and
any efforts would be detected years before deployment could be completed. Others add
that efforts on the part of rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction derive from regional rivalries, rather than a desire to threaten the US [Ref. 5].
A second charge made is that the NIE focused primarily on indigenous capability
and failed to analyze closely the strong likelihood of ballistic missile sales or technology
transfers. The IC stated it allowed for the acquisition of some foreign technology and
also concluded that no country with intercontinental missiles would sell them. A third
charge made was that the NIE did not account for the possibility of a catastrophic failure
of intelligence or analysis [Ref 55]. Some analysts have said we can never know the
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capabilities of rogue states, citing intelligence failures before and after World War II and
Iraq's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs as examples. The IC
said it recognizes this possibility but found it unlikely because ICBM programs progress
slowly, and the technological base and economic resources of hostile states are limited.
Others add that strategic technological surprise, such as ICBM programs, is very difficult
to achieve. Tactical or small-scale technological surprise is more likely. As a precaution,
the Administration is exploring emergency NMD concepts that could be deployed much
sooner than the '3+3' plan. Some have charged that the NTE was politicized, that its
outcome was skewed to favor the Clinton Administration's NMD plan. This charge has
been denied by senior Administration and IC officials [Ref. 34].
B. WORLD DEVELOPMENTS
A large number and expanding variety of ballistic missile systems are found in the
military arsenals of several nations. Most are imported, some are domestically
developed, and a few are indigenously modified. The current threat includes more than
25 countries armed with ballistic missiles, hundreds of missile launchers and thousands
of missiles with ranges up to 2,000 miles (Figure 5). In addition, Russia, China and North
Korea either possess or are developing inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that
could strike targets as distant as 6,000 to 8,000 miles, including the US [Ref. 18].
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Figure 5 Ref. 35
Ballistic missiles are appealing weapons for developing nations and often serve as
status symbols. Their long range, short flight time, relatively low cost and ability to carry
a variety of warheads, provide unique political and military advantages. In addition,
defenses against ballistic missiles are not as mature or widely deployed as defenses
against aircraft or other delivery systems. The importance of BMD is underscored by the
growing proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) [Ref. 26]. The nuclear club has grown in the past 20 years.
Currently, nine nations possess nuclear weapons and several more nations either have the
ability to develop nuclear weapons or have active nuclear weapons programs. Chemical
weapons have been dubbed "the poor man's atomic bomb" and are viewed as a fast,
attractive, and affordable alternative to nuclear weapons by many developing nations.
More than 30 developing nations have chemical weapons programs. Over a dozen
developing nations have biological weapons research programs, although they are
somewhat harder to develop and maintain than chemical weapons [Ref. 34].
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An example of the growing sophistication of Third World ballistic missile
developments is the long-range missiles that have been developed in North Korea. The
Nodong-1 was tested in 1994 and may be capable of carrying NBC weapons. The Taepo
Dong-1 was tested in 1998 and can certainly carry NBC weapons. Currently, the North
Koreans are developing the Taepo Dong-2 with a range of 3,000 miles, which will be
able to hit the US [Ref. 14]. In July 1995, and again in March 1996, China conducted
tests of its DF-15 and DF-21 short and medium range ballistic missiles off the coast of
Taiwan, at times as close as 20 miles from the Taiwanese coast [Ref. 5].
Today, Russia and China possess missiles capable of directly threatening the US.
While both countries continue to modernize their ballistic missile forces, the US
intelligence community continues to assess a deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized
attack by Russia or China on the US as unlikely. While no hostile nation currently
possesses the capability to threaten the US with ballistic missiles, the possibility of a
limited, long-range ballistic missile threat from a third world nation sometime in the not-
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C. CURRENT MISSILE STATUS
1. China
Since the end of WWII, the US has been to war three times: Korea, Vietnam and
Iraq. The East has been the hot-spot of the world for the last 40 years, and recent
developments are very troubling for vital US interests in the region.
China and Russia are the only two nations that currently posses long-range ICBM
missiles. These missiles can target any state in America with a NBC warhead of mass
destruction. Intelligence estimates China to have approximately 200 strategic ballistic
missiles. China has been a nuclear-capable nation since 1964. It has an advanced
chemical warfare program including extensive RDT&E, production, and weaponization.
Although China has stated it would never develop biological weapons, it does possess an
advanced biotechnology infrastructure and the bio-containment facilities to conduct R&D
of lethal pathogens [Ref. 5].
In recent years, China has been modernizing its ballistic missile program. China
is building more missiles and launchers for its stockpile and is replacing its liquid-
propellant arsenal with two new classes of solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The DF-31
will have a range of 5,000 miles and the DF-41 will have a range of 7,500 miles. Both
use solid propellant and have single re-entry vehicle warheads [Ref. 18].
Intelligence reports that China has at least one Xia-Class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in service. It carries 12 JL-1 Ship-Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs), each with a range of 1,056 miles. China is also developing a new
TYPE 094 SSBN that will carry 12 or more of China's newest SLBM, the JL-2, which
has an estimated range of 5,000 miles [Ref. 19].
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2. North Korea
North Korea is considered a greater threat to US national security and defense
than China. This is not because North Korea has superior missiles, but because North
Korea has been selling its ballistic missile technology, including entire missile systems,
to several countries known to be very anti-American, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya.
North Korea's missile program is also known to rely heavily upon Iranian financing [Ref.
3]-
Like China, North Korea has an active and mature chemical weapons program.
Established in the late 1980's, North Korea has accumulated a large stockpile of nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agents, all of which can be weaponized into ballistic missile
warheads. Unlike China, North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which allows international monitoring and inspections. North Korea also has a
well-established bio-weapons and nuclear weapons infrastructure. Although North Korea
is a signatory of both the Bio-Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Nuclear non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is believed to have a secretive weapons program to
continue development and weaponization of both [Ref. 3]. North Korea is known to be
very active in both the development and export of ballistic missiles. This makes them our
most dangerous neighbor.
3. India
India does not currently pose a known threat to the US. India has an active space
program that uses multiple stage ballistic missiles and has recently performed nuclear
testing, mostly in response to Pakistani nuclear testing. India has a full range of weapons
of mass destruction, but it has not yet coupled WMD technology to long-range ballistic
missiles for development or testing. It appears India has all the technology necessary to
create NBC weapons. However, since India is on the opposite side of the world from the
US, its does not pose a current threat [Ref. 34].
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4. Iran
We have formed temporary alliances with Iran in the past, but religious
differences have always created a rift between Iran and the US. Iran has never hidden its
hatred of the "Great Satan." Iran first began development of chemical and biological
warhead technology in response to Iraqi Scud attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran is
believed to have several hundred tons of blister, blood and choking agents which it has
imported from China and India and stockpiled [Ref. 23]. Iran has signed both the BWC
and the CWC, yet it continues to upgrade and expand its chemical and biological warfare
production infrastructure and weapons arsenal.
In the same tradition, Iran has signed the NPT, but NIE authorities believe Iran is
pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program. Iran's close proximity to several NBC
countries such as China, India, and Pakistan has motivated it to pursue NBC weapons and
ballistic missile technology. It is believed that Iran has acquired both North Korean
ballistic missiles currently in service - the Nodong-1 and the Taepo Dong-1. Iran also
has three domestic ballistic missile programs under development - the Shihab-3, Shihab-
4, and another program to develop a ballistic missile with a range of 6,200 miles [Ref.
23].
5. Russia
Tensions between Russia and the US have greatly eased since the cold war, but
the nuclear arsenals of both nations have not. Both nations still possess enough strategic
nuclear missiles to destroy most of the earth. Moscow has the world's largest declared
stockpile of chemical agents: 40,000 metric tons. As of January 1997, the Russian
stockpile of tactical nuclear warheads was estimated at 25,000 warheads, as well as a
missile arsenal of 3000 to 5000 missiles with over 1,200 operational ICBM and SLBM
launch platforms [Ref. 34]. Russia has come under criticism for alleged transfers of
WMD and ballistic missile technology to rogue states such as Iran, and has been
implicated in aiding missile programs in China, the Middle East, and South Asia.
46
The threat of Russian missile and WMD technology is as great as or greater than
that of North Korea and China. Russia has a much better developed and deeper stockpile
of ballistic missiles, and Russia is having rougher financial problems than Asia. This is
the primary reason why so much assistance money flows from the US to Russia. It is in
the US' s best interest to keep close tabs on Russia, and prevent Russia from selling it's
stockpiles to the highest bidder.
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V. CAPABILITY AND COST COMPARISON
This chapter is a cost comparison of the various proposals of the BMDO. It will
compare similar system costs, such as a comparison of PAC-3 to SM-2 Block IVA and
THAAD to SM-3. This chapter will also summarize available data on GBI, ABL, and
SBIRS. Most data presented in this chapter is summarized in Table 3.
A. PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3
The FY 1999 appropriation for PAC-3 is $322.3 million for RDT&E and $248.2
million for procurement. This funding supports deployment starting in 2000. An
intercept test for the PAC-3 missile was completed in the fourth quarter of FY98.
Operational testing began in March 1999 [Ref. 46].
The PAC-3 Missile Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
program began in October 1994. Production plans are for 1,500 missiles, 180 modified
Patriot launchers, and 74 modified Patriot radars. Total production costs are estimated at
$3 billion. Production of PAC-3 configuration one began in 1999 for a FUE in 2000
[Ref. 6].
B. STANDARD MISSILE - 2 BLOCK IV A
The total cost of the Navy Area BMD program is projected to be $8.98 billion,
including $2.05 billion for research and development, $4.18 billion for procurement, and
$2.76 billion for operation and support. At of the end of FY98, more than $1.2 billion
had been appropriated for system development [Ref. 30].
Low Rate Initial Production will begin in Fiscal Year 2000, with an FUE date in
Fiscal Year 2002. The Navy plans to produce 185 Block IVA missiles, 12 percent of its
total planned production quantity, during LREP. The estimated cost for these 185
missiles is $568.2 million. Each Block IVA missile is expected to have an average unit
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cost of about $3 million [Ref. 50]. The BMDO Fiscal Year 1999 budget appropriation
for the Navy Area BMD program is $246 million for RDT&E and $43 million in
procurement funds. As part of a BMDO/Navy "shared approach" for the Navy Area
BMD program, the DoN has requested a plus-up in the FY 2000/01 procurement budget
of $111 million.
C. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE MISSILE
The DoD FY 1999 budget of $853 million fully supports deployment of the
THAAD system in 2006. This level of funding is required for completion of the PD&RR
flight test program, continuing risk reduction for EMD, and for acquiring missiles for a
UOES capability. The budget is tied to three concurrent contractual requirements.
$445.3 million is slated for the extension and completion of the PD&RR flight test
program and completion of the Pre-EMD risk mitigation effort. This risk reduction effort
is principally focused on the design of the EMD radar and battle management software,
both of which are on the critical path to achieving the FUE in Fiscal Year 2006. Another
$302.9 million will be used to initiate EMD and its associated start-up costs, such as
materiel orders, Government-Furnished Equipment procurement, and "turning on" five
major subcontractors. Substantial portions of the EMD start-up costs are associated with
the THAAD radar development and not the interceptor missile. Finally, about $105
million will be used to execute the UOES missile purchase of 40 missiles [Ref. 47]. This
will provide the warfighter in FY 2001/2002 with an interim capability until the objective
system is fielded. The THAAD program finally completed its scheduled test missile
intercept on 10 June 1999. This will allow exercise of the UOES contract option.
In September 1992, the US Army awarded the RDT&E contract for THAAD to
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space Company at an initial contract award cost of $689
million. The terms of the contract included three complete THAAD systems comprising
three GBRs, three launchers, and 20 missiles. Total production plans are estimated to
call for 1,422 missiles, 99 launchers, and 18 GBR units at an estimated cost of $1 1.3
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billion for the THAAD missiles and launchers, and $5.4 billion for the Raytheon GBRs.
FY 1997 RDT&E funding was $445.3 million [Ref. 47].
Program officials state that the hit-to-kill intercept technology is sound. They
have had 7 of 22 successful tests during development of the warhead. They attribute the
six missed targets to basic rocketry malfunctions, not the hit-to-kill guidance. The
rocketry malfunctions were caused by problems such as dust in the infrared seeker eye, a
guidance wiring short, and a cable crimped in the wrong place [Ref. 4].
THAAD 's record of six hit-to-kill attempts and one success bodes badly for
continued developmental testing. Lockheed Martin, the lead contractor, must have two
successful hit-to-kill target intercepts by 30 June 1999, or it will pay for its failure with a
$20 million penalty [Ref. 19]. As of 10 May 1999, $13.9 billion has been spent on
THAAD research and development. The estimated total cost for THAAD Production is
$16.7 billion [Ref. 28]. As yet, THAAD production remains unfunded.
D. STANDARD MISSILE - 3
The Navy Theater-Wide BMD program is currently in the Program Definition &
Risk Reduction phase of development, and has passed an initial Milestone I Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) Review. As of 4 May 1999, NTW is approved for Baseline
[Ref. 14]. The Navy is following an evolutionary acquisition approach consisting of an
initial Block I, system followed by a more-capable Block II system.
The Fiscal Year 1999 budget request for Navy Theater-Wide is $368 million.
E. GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR
Future NMD funding requirements depend on how the system is designed and
when and where it will be deployed. The government and prime contractor have not yet
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agreed on a final system design, and the deployment schedule and location will not be
definitive until, at least, the fiscal year 2000 deployment review. To provide a basis for
estimating funding requirements, the BMDO prepared four different life-cycle cost
estimates (Figure 6), based on two deployment locations - one at Grand Forks, North
Dakota, and the other in Alaska, and two capability levels - one available in 2003 and the
other in 2006. An initial operating capability would be established in 2006, and the full
operating capability would be achieved in 2009 [Ref. 6]. The life-cycle cost estimates
show the total costs to develop and produce system components, construct facilities,
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Figure 6 Ref. 6
F. AIRBORNE LASER (ABL)
The Air Force estimates the life-cycle cost of the ABL program to be about $11
billion. That estimate includes $1.3 billion for the program definition and risk reduction
phase, $1.2 billion for the engineering and manufacturing development phase, $3.8
billion for the primary production phase, and $4.9 billion for 20 years of continuing
production, operation, and support [Ref. 54].
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G. SPACE-BASED INFRA-RED (SBIR)
DoD has estimated the SBIR research, production, and operation life cycle costs
as $17.5 billion during FYs 1997-2020. Note that in Table 3 this cost total is included
even though other program operation costs are not included. The SBIR program is
scheduled for deployment in 2006, with 2007 through 2020 dollars being used for
production [Ref. 52].
H. SUMMARY
The 1999 FYDP increased National Missile Defense System RDT&E funding by
$1.4 billion, or 75 percent ($1.8 billion to $3.2 billion), from the 1998 FYDP. Despite
the increase of $1.4 billion, considerable risk remains with the program's funding. For
example, technical and schedule risks are very high. High technical risk is likely to cause
increased costs and program delays and could cause program failure [Ref. 53]. The 1999
FYDP does not include funds to procure the missile system. If the decision were made in
2000 to deploy an initial system by 2003, billions of dollars of procurement funds would
be required to augment the currently programmed research and development funds.
This chapter focuses on research, development, and production costs. There is very
little data available on the operating cost these systems will require. This is because
operating costs for a system not yet in operation are very hard to estimate. Table 3 is a
comparison of the total costs of a BMDO proposed system to its capability. R&D and
Production Costs are aggregate sums of all appropriations spent to date and an estimate of
what further funding will be required for full development. The only operating cost data
that were available was for the SM-2 block rVA and ABL. A comparison of capability to
cost using Table 3 is problematic. The altitude, range and speed data on Table 3 are all
unclassified. This means that this is not necessarily reality. A greater problem exists for
this thesis in that, there is consistently significant error when calculating out-year data.
An estimate for money that will be spent in 2009 has a great chance for error. At best, if
all the data is estimated consistently, then comparing the estimated data will yield correct
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conclusions. For example, the exact maximum altitude that the PAC-3 and SM-2 Block
IVA can reach is not known, but their unclassified data are similar. Therefore we can
conclude that the capabilities of the missile are similar.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The intent of this thesis was to determine which, if any, missile technologies were
needed to research, develop, and produce the components needed for a cost-effective
NMD. The original hypothesis was that no technology was needed and a currently
available SM-2 block IV missile could perform the mission of NMD. The SM-2 IV is a
relatively slow, fragmentation warhead, that simply will not intercept and destroy
ICBMs.
The SM-2 Block IVA is the lower-tier interceptor missile which is almost fully
developed and is in Low Rate Initial Production for a FUE in 2002. The PAC-3 and SM-
2 Block IVA were both developed and are being produced at Raytheon. This has allowed
the DoD a significant cost avoidance and should be the model for the SM-3 and THAAD
missiles.
The upper-tier missiles, SM-3 and THAAD, are continuing separate development,
primarily because the Navy will not use a liquid propellant rocket motor for fire and
safety reasons. The Army is not constrained to keep its THAAD missiles close together,
as the Navy must do, and can produce a more capable rocket with liquid fuel. The kill-
vehicle or warhead of the two missiles will share an 85% commonality, which will save
over $150 million [Ref. 51].
The lower-tier and upper-tier missiles are intended to be developmental steps
toward building a Ground-Based Interceptor missile. Most of the information on the
capability of the GBI is classified.
A primary question in researching this thesis was: If ground-based exo-
atmospheric defense missiles are necessary, why reinvent the wheel? Why not use an
Aegis/SPY Radar system controlled by a Linebacker computer, and SM-2 block IVA
57
(and later SM-3) missiles in an earthen VLS silo? The problem with this approach is the
range of the interceptor missile. The SM-2 and SM-3 will, at best, be capable of
protecting a 500 to 700 mile diameter circle of earth. It is intended that the North Dakota
GBI site will protect all of the US from one central site. Consequently the GBI will be a
very large missile that will likely have to be transported in segments by truck or train.
The Ground-Based Radar will be five stories tall. In order to implement a multi-site
NMD using Aegis and SM-2/3 technology, DoD would have to build a grid of sites
spanning the US.
Is THAAD a necessary procurement? In most cases it is not. Since THAAD and
SM-3 will have very similar capabilities, SM-3 can perform the role of Theater Missile
Defense if it is in close enough proximity to the forces needing protection. In Korea,
Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Kosovo, the SM-3 missile would have been in close
enough proximity to provide theater missile defense. It is only in conflicts where the
confrontation is significantly inland and out of the range of SM-3 and Aegis that THAAD
would be required.
THAAD does have an obvious advantage over SM-3 in performing the role of
NMD. THAAD can be deployed throughout the US until GBI missile development and
production is complete. THAAD could protect the interior of America, while SM-3
could only provide a coastal NMD. If THAAD must be built, then why build a
proprietary THAAD Ground-based radar? By using existing SPY/Aegis Radar
technology, the THAAD program could convert an existing phased array radar into a
portable THAAD GBR and avoid the cost of creating a compete new production line.
In the 1990s, the US seems to have taken on the role of the police force for the
world. The current, worldwide US Navy infrastructure provides an opportunity for the
US to control the ICBM threat to a large percentage of the world. The US Navy currently
has Aegis ships in Everett, WA; San Diego, CA; Pascagula, MS; Mayport, FL; Norfolk,
VA; Pearl Harbor, HI, and Yokosuka, Japan. They maintain a constant presence in the
Persian Gulf and, recently, a presence in the Adriatic Sea. The US maintains Navy bases
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in Guam: Concord (SF), CA; Seal Beach (LA), CA; Grotton, CT: Charleston, NC; Key
West. FL; New Jersey; Rota Spain; Naples. Italy; Sasebo, Japan and Bahrain. Just
putting SM-3 missiles on Aegis ships and networking data with space assets will provide
the US and its forces with a worldwide NMD and TBMD presence.
An analysis of TABLE 3 reveals that THAAD has greater altitude but less range
than SM-3. This is an anomaly in that these are the manufacturers unclassified
capabilities. In reality, SM-3 and THAAD will likely have similar capabilities, just as
PAC-3 and SM-2 Block IVA have similar capabilities today. This thesis attempts to
hypothesize cost avoidance by not procuring alternate missile systems. The incremental
approach of developing and producing first an upper-tier BMD system and next an upper-
tier BMD system to ultimately develop the Ground-Based Interceptor missile that can
protect all of the US seems reasonable. In examining the development paths in this case
the redundancy becomes immediately clear. PAC-3 and THAAD are very redundant of
SM-2 block IVA and SM-3.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Overcome the ABM treaty and Create a Multi-Site NMD.
Under the proposals of the BMDO, a Ground-Based Interceptor single-site NMD
can not be deployed until 2009. A SM-2 Block IVA multi-ship coastal NMD could be
deployed by 2002 and upgraded to SM-3 by 2007. A THAAD based CONUS multi-site
NMD could be deployed by 2007. Any multi-site ABM defense proposal is in violation
of the 1972 ABM treaty [Ref. 1]. The US should eliminate the ABM Treaty or pursue
negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty to permit:
- Multiple sea and ground-based interceptor sites.
- Unrestricted use of ABM sensors regardless of location.
- Unrestricted testing of ABM systems at observable test ranges.
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By combining NMD with efforts to improve security at borders and ports of entry,
the US will counter terrorist NBC strikes and significantly raise the expense and risks to
potential NBC attackers. A few 'suitcase' bombs or a handful of strategic missiles will
no longer be sufficient to guarantee strikes on the US [Ref. 25]. Arsenals that are
substantial, sophisticated, and costly will be required. Some potential NBC aggressors
might forgo pursuing a long-range strike option, while others might face significant
delays in their ability to deploy significant arsenals. As for countries that do retain or
acquire strategic arsenals, the US will have greater flexibility to deal with them if we are
secured against limited threats. America's force projection capability, which is vital to
implementing US global strategy, can only be maintained if the US is protected.
A far-reaching agenda with NMD as its centerpiece might seem unrealistic. But
even a few steps in this direction would be worth the effort. In the early 1990s, Moscow
and Washington began unprecedented talks on BMD cooperation, and Washington and
Beijing took important steps toward initiating a strategic dialogue as well. Ballistic
missile attacks during the 1991 Persian Gulf War prompted heightened global interest in
tactical and strategic defenses, especially on the part of some US allies [Ref. 21]. The
foundation is already in place and ready to support expanded, even global, BMD
deployments.
The US faces a stark reality as it nears the twenty-first century. The country's
vulnerability invites ballistic missile attack. In addition to putting the American people at
risk, this threat might cripple the country's ability to join with its allies in leading the
world toward a new international security framework. Failure in this mission will ensure
that the world is an increasingly dangerous place in the future.
The decisions to invest in protection against future threats are not easy. Indeed,
history records the plight of countless nations that pursued fragmented defense policies
and failed to see disaster until it knocked on their door. The United States can avoid
adding its name to this list by endorsing strategic defense and BMD in the nation's
defense doctrine and force posture.
60
As development continues it is becoming apparent that the development costs of a
single-site, Ground-based interceptor and missile system is going to be astronomical.
The driver in this proposal is the 1972 ABM treaty. By eliminating this treaty the US can
create a multiple-site NMD using nearly completed technology such as PAC-3, SM-2,
THAAD, and SM-3, and avoid the great expenditures that will be required for GBI/GBR
development and production.
2. Upgrade our Current NMD Defense Assets.
The Linebacker upgrade should be implemented on all Aegis ships. It is
estimated that approximately $115 million dollars is required to bring all Aegis radar
computers up to the minimum level for the 6.3 baseline prerequisite to integrate the
Linebacker upgrade [Ref. 13]. The Linebacker upgrade requires the integration of
millions of lines of software code into the Aegis AN/UYK-7 computers. The AN/UYK
computers use early 1980's technology. They are essentially Intel 8088 10-Mhz
computer processors. It is essential that all Aegis ships be capable of performing Area
and Theater BMD. The only question is how to bring all Aegis ships up to the 6.3
baseline.
3. Linebacker Upgrade Should Integrate the COTS Program.
Current DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers cost about $1 billion each to
build and about $9,000 each hour to operate [Ref. 7]. Yet the AN/UYK-7 computers
onboard the DDG-51 use 8088 10-Mhz computer CPUs. A current Pentium EQ 550-Mhz
Central Processing Unit is at least 55 times more powerful than the older 8088. Pentium
HI - 550 CPUs cost around $800 each, with prices dropping every day.
The Computer Off-The-Shelf (COTS) program is an effort to reduce production
costs of all military computers by moving away from custom-built computer chips toward
standard, commercially-available, competitively-priced computer hardware. This
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program will be part of the DD-21 and CG-21 programs, and it should be part of the
Navy Area and Theater-Wide BMD programs as well.
4. Implement Coastal NMD.
SM-2 IVA can perform effective coastal NMD by intercepting ICBMs launched
at the US. All inbound ICBMs must pass through the SM-2 block IVA missile's
intercept envelope prior to hitting targets near the coast. THAAD will not be ready any
earlier than 2006, while SM-2 IVA will be ready by 2002.
The current proposal is to place all of the LRIP SM-2 block IVA missiles on Lake
Erie and Port Royal for continued testing and development of Navy Area TBMD
technology [Ref. 501. This will likely accelerate the full development of the SM-2
missile and assist with the development of the SM-3, but it will negate an early advantage
of the SM-2 Block IVA missile. US Navy bases are evenly distributed to the corners of
the US. There are naval bases in Everett, WA; San Diego, CA; Pascagula, MS; Mayport,
FL; Norfolk, VA; and Grotton, CT. By distributing the LRIP SM-2 missiles to Aegis
cruisers and destroyers already home-ported at these bases, and then linking those ships
with ICBM threat data cueing from NORAD, the US will have a viable coastal NMD in
the near future, four years earlier than either THAAD or GBI can deliver.
5. Cueing Threat-Axis Data to Aegis Ships.
Using existing technology there are sufficient assets for effective detection of
ICBM launches and monitoring of space. NORAD already has the space surveillance
technology, assets, and personnel in place to detect and track inbound ICBMs. This has
been NORAD' s primary mission for the last 20+ years [Ref. 12]. It would take little
more than a high-speed, encrypted Internet connection to allow NORAD to pass target
threat-axis data to Navy ships in port around the country. The Aegis cruisers and
destroyers could then activate their radars, lock onto the ICBMs, and launch interceptor
missiles.
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6. Upgrade Our Ally's Defense Technology.
The Japanese Navy should receive SM-2 Block IVA technology as soon as
possible. Japanese Aegis destroyers are already in good positions to intercept and destroy
ICBMs before they become a threat to the US. The Japanese Navy has long been a part
of Aegis. They have several Congo Class destroyers, which are very similar to US Navy
Arleigh Burke class destroyers. These destroyers integrate the latest Aegis technology
and upgrades. The Japanese have given the US DoD $100 million to participate in
development and production of the SM-2 Block IVA [Ref. 14]. It is logical to place these
missiles (and eventually SM-3 missiles) on Japanese destroyers. Japan is in an excellent
position to intercept ICBM missiles bound for the US.
7. DD-21 and CG-21 Program Integration of SPY/Aegis Technology.
The US Navy DD-21 land attack destroyer program is scheduled to begin
replacing today's aging DD-963 class destroyers and FFG-7 class frigates, starting in
2010 [Ref. 41]. The plan is to buy thirty-two DD-21 destroyers at a total cost of $25
billion. The price-per-ship cost cap of $750 million for each destroyer would apply after
the fifth destroyer. Because the DD-21 is designated as a land attack destroyer and
because the two ship classes it is replacing do not have Aegis, the Aegis / SPY radar
system is not a current requirement for the DD-21 program. Because integration of the
Aegis combat system into DD-21 is cost-prohibitive and will likely exceed the $750
million cost cap, it is estimated that there is only a 50% chance that Aegis will be part of
DD-21 [Ref. 7].
If the Navy is going to conduct the missions of Area BMD, Theater-Wide BMD,
and Coastal NMD, then it is imperative that the DD-21 integrate the Aegis combat
system. As TBMs proliferate, there is a greater chance they will be used in regional and
littoral warfare against our own troops. The DD-21 land attack destroyer will play a
major role in the defense of US Marines going ashore. If the DD-21 is to provide a
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credible defense, it needs to have the ability to intercept area and theater ballistic
missiles.
64
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ABM TREATY RESTRICTIONS
Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1 972
Entered into force on 3 October 1972
Treaty is specifically between Russia and the US. No other countries have signed
or were involved in the ABM treaty.
Article I
Neither the US nor Russia will deploy ABM systems for defense of the territory
of its country or defense of an individual region except in specific defense of a national
capital or an ICBM silo installation.
Article III
An ABM system in defense of a national capital or ICBM silo installation shall be
no larger than a 150 km deployment area, with no more than one hundred ABM missile
launchers, and no more than two large phased-array radar.
Article V
Neither Russia nor the US will develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. And no
ABM system will be capable of launching more than one ABM interceptor at a time.
Article VI
Not to deploy radar for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except
along the periphery of its national territory.
h5
Article IX
Not to deploy ABM systems or components outside national territory.
Article XV
This treaty shall be of unlimited duration unless parties choose to withdraw.
Signed by Richard Nixon, President of the US and L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU. [Ref. 1]
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